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Administrative Justice in the United Kingdom 
 
Gordon Anthony * 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the better-known features of UK administrative law, at least when viewed from a comparative 
perspective, is its relative youth as an organised system of principles centred upon the rule of law.1 
Traditionally, much scholarly interest in that system has focused upon judicial review as a means for 
mediating relations between individuals and the state (and as between state bodies themselves), 
where the courts have famously developed new grounds for reviewing the actions and inactions of 
public authorities.2 However, while doctrinal developments remain the primary concern of much 
scholarship in the UK, recent years have also seen a growing academic interest in “administrative 
justice” as a framework for analysing relations between individuals and the state.3 Although the term 
“administrative justice” does not lend itself to singular definition – a point that is returned to below 
– it is generally associated with a more holistic approach to citizen redress that regards judicial review 
as but one mechanism among (many) others that include tribunals, ombudsmen, and alternative 
dispute resolution.4 The nature of this shift has been seen not just in an increased use of empirically 
grounded studies in administrative justice5, but also in a restatement of the values that are said to 
condition exercises of public power.6 Administrative justice has thus absorbed the values of legality, 
fairness and rationality that have historically defined judicial review whilst also making links to values 
that are more readily associated with governance studies – transparency, accountability, input 
participation, efficiency, and so on.  
 The corresponding purposes of this article are modest: to explain in more detail how and why 
the language of administrative justice has become more prominent in recent years; to identify some 
of the primary mechanisms of administrative justice and how they interact with one another; and to 
note some of the challenges that administrative justice faces in an era of government austerity. This 
last point is perhaps the most telling of those to be made, as reduced government spending on the 
mechanisms that facilitate administrative justice inevitably has the potential to hollow out the very 
values that are said to infuse administrative justice. This prospect has since given rise to a number of 
applications for judicial review in which challenges have been made either to the fact of changes in 
funding or to institutional failures that have resulted from a reduced capacity to provide services to 
                                                     
* Professor of Public Law, Queen’s University, Belfast. This is a revised version of a paper that was presented at a meeting 
of the Italian Administrative Law Group in Naples on 17 April 2015. My thanks are due to Professors Sandulli and della 
Cananea for inviting me to participate at the meeting. My thanks are also due to participants at the seminar for their 
interesting and challenging questions on aspects of UK law - I have made every effort to incorporate answers to those 
questions in the text of this article. 
 
1 See J Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2000.  
2 For a seminal account see H Woolf et al, De Smith’s Judicial Review, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 7th ed, 2013. 
3 An important contribution is M Partington, ‘Restructuring administrative justice? The redress of citizens’ grievances’ 
(1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 173, discsussed below.  
4 See generally M Adler (eds), Administrative Justice in Context, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010.  
5 See, eg, S Halliday, Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004 and R 
Thomas, Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011. 
6 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration, Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2009, p 483. 
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the public.7 While not all of the cases have succeeded – the principles of judicial review of course 
provide for judicial restraint where that is deemed appropriate – they have revealed in sharp form 
the tension that can exist between some of the normative and practical dimensions to administrative 
justice. They have, at the same time, also revealed something of an irony about the role that judicial 
review now plays within administrative justice: while judicial review remains the primary barometer 
of the legality of government choices, access to it can be affected by reduced government spending 
in the important social area of legal aid.8  
 The analysis begins with a short section that traces the emergence of administrative justice 
as a field of study and which considers one of the primary ways in which it may be defined. There 
then follows a section that provides an overview of consultation requirements in UK law, of the 
functions of the office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, and of the roles that are played by tribunals 
and judicial review. Although an overview of such mechanisms can only ever offer a partial insight 
into their significance, the purpose of this section is to give examples of some of the ways in which 
the values of legality, accountability, participation and so on take form in UK law. The final 
substantive section returns to the matter of austerity and administratve justice, while the conclusion 
offers some summative points about the role and relevance of administrative justice.  
 
 
TOWARDS “ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE” 
 
The historically dominant position that judicial review has occupied in scholarship reflects nothing 
more than the fact that it has defined many important developments in both the constitutional and 
administrative law of the UK.9 Even before the current judicial review procedure was introduced by 
statute law in the late 1970s/early 1980s10, the courts had already drawn upon the common law to 
identify key elements of, what Garner termed, a “coherent system of administrative procedure”.11 
Central to that procedure were requirements of fairness and a prohibition on the abuse of power, 
and the judges also took steps to safeguard their supervisory jurisdiction in the face of apparently 
clear legislative overrides on access to the courts. 12  However, while such case law arguably 
introduced a nascent public/private divide into UK law, it was with the procedural reforms of the late 
1970s/early 1980s that that divide assumed a fundamental importance.13 In some of its earliest 
rulings under the new procedure, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) variously held that public 
law rights and interests could be vindicated only by way of application for judicial review14; that the 
new rules on standing were intended to avoid technical distinctions that had previously governed 
access to remedies15; and that the grounds for judicial review were fluid and open to change.16 While 
the requirement that individuals vindicate their rights and interests exclusively through the judicial 
                                                     
7 E.g., R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin), [2015] 2 CMLR 4 at 111, and Re Martin’s Application 
[2012] NIQB 89, discussed below. 
8 For some issues see IS v The Director of Legal Aid Casework [2015] EWHC 1965 (Admin). 
9 See generally W Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law, Oxford University Press, 11th ed, 2014. 
10 For the position in England and Wales see Wade and Forsyth, n 9 above, ch 18. For Northern Ireland, see G Anthony, 
Judicial Review in Northern Ireland, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2nd ed, 2014, ch 3; and, for Scotland, see C Himsworth, 
‘Judicial Review in Scotland’ in M Supperstone et al (eds), Judicial Review, Lexis Nexis, London, 5th ed, 2014, pp 865-929. 
11 JF Garner, ‘Administrative Law – A Step Forward?’ (1968) 31 Modern Law Review 446. 
12 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40; Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997; Anisminic v Foreign Compensation 
Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 
13 Although not in Scotland: see West v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385. 
14 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237. 
15 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617. 
16 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410-411, Lord Diplock. 
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review procedure proved to be unduly rigid – its effects were subsequently relaxed17 – the approach 
to standing and to the grounds for review provided the basis for far-reaching development of the 
law. The standing rules thus came to be read liberally and in a way that facilitated applications for 
judicial review not just by individuals but also by pressure groups18, while the grounds for review 
expanded on the basis of both the common law and in the light of European influences.19  
 The scholarly move away from studying judicial review primarily within its doctrinal 
parameters was prompted by a number of factors. One was an awareness that developments in 
relation to standing and so on tended to happen in “high profile judicial review” cases that often 
raised matters of considerable political importance involving central government Ministers.20 The 
point here was not that the cases were wholly exceptional – they typically contained important 
statements about the rule of law principle that operates at the heart of administrative law – but 
rather that they were factually very different from the vast majority of cases that were heard by way 
of application for judicial review. Empirical research conducted in the 1990s, in particular, established 
that judicial review cases tended to concentrate in areas such as prisons, immigration and housing, 
and academic interest was drawn to the question whether judicial review had any discernible impact 
on the quality of bureaucratic decision-making in those areas.21 While this gave rise to inevitable 
definitional and methodological challenges – notably how to identify and measure impact22 – it 
marked a clear shift away from a positivist scholarly tradition towards one that was more socio-legal 
in nature.23 The corresponding aim of the new scholarship was to fill in “gaps in our empirical 
knowledge” and to “consider the significance of those gaps” as part of wider debates about the role 
of judicial review in the UK.24 
 Another factor that prompted the change in approach was the reality that, for the vast 
majority of individuals, their interactions with the administrative state occurred in fora other than 
the High Court that hears applications for judicial review. At its most obvious, this was a point about 
the role of specialist tribunals that were established by statute and given an adjudicatory function in 
areas such as social security, mental health, and education.25 Although the decisions of tribunals were 
(and are) subject either to a right of appeal or to judicial review – the current structures are outlined 
below – tribunals were intended to give individuals access to a system of justice that was more 
efficient and informed than that which would be provided by the ordinary courts.26 Moreover, even 
before individuals could have recourse to tribunals and/or the courts, there could be an expectation 
                                                     
17 Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 AC 624. See too, more recently, 
Ruddy v Chief Constable of Strathclyde [2012] UKSC 57, 2013 SC (UKSC) 126. 
18 See, eg, R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 
1 WLR 386 and R (Child Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC 2579 (Admin), 
[2012] ACD 109. But note that the position is more restrictive where cases fall under section 7 the Human Rights Act 
1998: see, eg, Re The Committee on the Administration of Justice’s Application [2005] NIQB 25. 
19 P Craig, Administrative Law, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 7th ed, 2012, chs 12-23.  
20 The phrase is Peter Cane’s: see ‘Understanding Judicial Review and its Impact’ in M Hertogh and S Halliday (eds), Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p 15 
at p 18.  
21 See, perhaps most famously, the Public Law Project’s Judicial Review in Perspective: An Investigation of Trends in the 
Use and Operation of the Judicial Review Procedure in England and Wales (London, 1993).  
22 See further Cane n 20 above. 
23 On which shift see further, eg, C Hunter (eds), Integrating Socio-Legal Studies into the Law Curriculum, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012. 
24 M Sunkin and G Richardson, ‘Judicial review: questions of impact’ (1996) Public Law 79. 
25 See further Wade and Forsyth, n 9 above, ch 23. 
26 See the Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, 1957, Cmnd 218 (the so-called “Franks 
Report”).  
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that they would first engage in attempts at alternative dispute resolution or that they would avail 
themselves of mechanisms for “internal” reviews of contested decisions.27 Such requirements, which 
have been said to have become “de rigueur” in recent years28, were intended to deal with disputes 
at their source and in a way that allowed individuals to participate more directly in any 
reconsideration of a decision that affected them. 29 Outside of such pre-action and court-based 
remedies, there remained the possibility of recourse to a number of other mechanisms for raising 
grievances, notably commissions, ombudsmen, and inquiries.30  
The argument that these mechanisms should be viewed holistically – and from the 
perspective of “administrative justice” – was made by a number of commentators who included 
Martin Partington.31 For Partington, administrative justice was a concept that, while admittedly 
difficult to define, embraced “the whole range of decision-taking from first decision to final appeal, 
not simply those processes that can be labelled ‘adjudicative’”.32 Partington’s concern here was that, 
if attention were to be given only “to what happens at stages after the initial decision has been 
taken”, this “would be to ignore the fundamental challenge of administrative justice, to get the 
decision right first time round”.33 Of course, this begs the anterior question of how to ensure that 
decisions can be “right the first time round”, and Partington noted the importance of key values and 
principles such as participation, transparency, fairness, efficiency, consistency, rationality, equality, 
and choice and consultation. 34 While other commentators have rightly cautioned that the out-
workings of such values are crucially affected by matters of institutional culture35, Partington’s 
approach posited a continuum along which the values of participation and so on could be protected 
at any time from administration through to adjudication. On this reading, administrative justice might 
fairly be described as, “the overall system by which decisions of an administrative or executive nature 
are made in relation to particular persons including (a) the procedure for making such decisions, (b) 
the law under which such decisions are made and (c) the systems for resolving disputes and airing 
grievances in relation to such decisions”.36 
It is important to note that Partington accepted that there is no set definition of 
administrative justice and that his contribution was made with that point very much in mind.37 His 
definition does, however, still offer a useful framework for analysing the role of the various 
mechanisms of administrative justice, albeit that two comments might be made about his approach. 
The first concerns the difference between “administrative justice” and “administrative law”, as the 
                                                     
27 On alternative dispute resolution see S Boyron, ‘The rise of mediation in administrative law disputes: experiences from 
England, France and Germany’ [2006] Public Law 320. For an example of internal review see Freedom of Information Act 
2000, ss 45 and 50(2)(a), as read with the Government issued Code of Practice at 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/information-access-rights/foi-guidance-for-practitioners/code-of-practice. 
28 P Birkinshaw, ‘Grievances, Remedies and the State – Revisited and Re-appraised’ in Adler (eds) n 4 above, p 353.  
29 But compare D Cowan and S Halliday (ed), The Appeal of Internal Review: Law, Administrative Justice and the (non-) 
Emergence of Disputes, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004. 
30 See further T Mullen, ‘A Holistic Approach to Administrative Justice’ in Adler (eds) n 4 above, p 383. 
31 N 3 above, and, eg, M Harris and M Partington (ed), Administrative Justice in the 21st Century, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
1999. See also, eg, M Adler, ‘A Socio-Legal Approach to Administrative Justice’ (2003) 25 Law and Policy 323. 
32 N 3 above at 176. 
33 N 3 above at 178. 
34 See also R Thomas, ‘Administrative justice, better decisions, and organisational learning’ [2015] Public Law 111. 
35 On which idea see S Halliday and C Scott, ‘A Cultural Analysis of Administrative Justice’ in Adler (eds) n 4 above, p 183, 
and references therein. 
36  Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, Sch 17, para 13; since repealed by Public Bodies (Abolition of 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council) Order 2013/2042, Sch 1, para 36.  
37 N 3 above at 174. For some of the different approaches to the concept see the contributions in Harris and Partington 
(ed) n 31 above. See, also, the website of the UK Administrative Justice Institute at http://ukaji.org/.  
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above description of administrative justice would plainly suggest a large degree of overlap with the 
body of (administrative) law that regulates the exercise and non-exercise of power by public bodies.38 
On this point, Partington himself acknowledged the extent of overlap but suggested that the 
difference was ultimately to be found in administrative law’s primary focus on judicial review as 
compared to administrative justice’s interest in “a much wider variety of activity and values than 
simply the work of the higher courts”.39 Whether this is where the real dividing line between the two 
is to be found may, however, be doubted, particularly given Peter Cane’s analysis of the difference 
between the two. In his seminal book on administrative law, Cane suggests that administrative justice 
is, in some respects, “narrower” than administrative law because of its “focus on the making of 
decisions about individuals”. While Cane also accepts that administrative justice’s focus upon 
individual engagement at the administrative stage perhaps lies beyond traditional understandings of 
administrative law, he notes that administrative law continues to regulate areas of very real 
significance that apparently do not come within the ambit of administrative justice. As he writes: 
“One of the most significant aspects of public administration is the making of legal rules (secondary 
legislation) and the development of general policies (soft law), and administrative law has quite a lot 
to say about bureaucratic law-making and policy-making”.40 
The second comment concerns the values and principles that exist across Partington’s 
administration-adjudication continuum. It has already noted in the introduction that these values 
and principles represent something of an amalgam of those that have historically been found in 
judicial review and in governance studies. While it is inevitable that some of the values and principles 
will have much greater import at different stages on the continuum, the passage of time may well 
have resulted with judicial review absorbing and mobilising some of governance’s values at the 
adjudication end of the spectrum. An example here may be transparency, which, for some, has 
entered the lexicon of more traditional public law scholarship.41   
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE – SOME MECHANISMS 
 
Turning to some of the primary mechanisms that underlie the workings of administrative justice, 
there are four that fall for consideration in this article: consultation requirements; the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman; tribunals; and judicial review. As will become apparent below, these examples have 
been chosen because they reveal something about the nature of the administration-adjudication 
continuum, as well as about the manner in which the various mechanisms for redress link together. 
They also reveal something about how disputes might be solved at source before recourse is had to 
more formal mechanisms: to take judicial review as an example, there is a well-established pre-action 
protocol that must be observed in almost all cases before proceedings can be brought in the High 
Court.  
 
 
Consultation  
 
                                                     
38 For some of the possible definitions see Harlow and Rawlings, n 6 above, ch 1, and Craig, n 19 above, ch 1. 
39 N 3 above at 175.  
40 Administrative Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 5th ed, 2011, pp 18-19.  
41 See C Howell, ‘Is There a General Principle Requiring Transparency about How Decisions Will be Taken?’ [2011] 16 
Judicial Review 322.  
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Consultation requirements in the UK are underpinned both by traditional common law principles of 
fairness – sometimes also referred to as the rules of natural justice – and by a more recent emphasis 
on participation as a value that should inform decision-making. Certainly, the common law has long 
been synonymous with the right to a fair hearing, which, while historically linked to a more narrow 
protection of rights and interests, now potentially applies whenever “(anyone) decides anything”.42 
This broadening of the scope of application of the rules of fairness has been one part of the doctrinal 
narrative that has emerged around judicial review, where the courts have noted the importance of 
hearing rights even in the difficult context of national security cases.43 However, it is also true that 
consultation requirements are not the sole preserve of the common law, as they can be imposed by 
a statute that delegates a power of decision to a public decision-maker.44 They can also feature at 
the level of what might be termed “soft law”, viz where government bodies decide that best practice 
in any event requires that they should actively to seek to ascertain the views of those who will be 
affected by a decision that is to be taken.45  
The rationale for fair hearing rights/consultation and participation in decision-making has 
been considered in two recent rulings of the UK Supreme Court. The first was Re Reilly’s Application, 
which concerned the elements of the right to a fair hearing when prisoners come before a panel of 
Parole Commissioners.46 In considering the principles and values that illuminate the common law, 
Lord Reed stated that “[T]here is no doubt that one of the virtues of procedurally fair decision-making 
is that it is liable to result in better decisions, by ensuring that the decision-maker receives all relevant 
information that is properly tested”.47 His Lordship also noted the imperative of avoiding “the sense 
of injustice which the person who is the subject of the decision will otherwise feel”, where he added 
that “justice is intuitively understood to require a procedure which pays due respect to persons 
whose rights are significantly affected by decisions taken in the exercise of administrative or judicial 
functions. Respect entails that such persons ought to be able to participate in the procedure by which 
the decision is made, provided they have something to say which is relevant to the decision to be 
taken”.48 His Lordship concluded his comments by linking procedural fairness to the rule of law: 
“Procedural requirements that decision-makers should listen to persons who have something 
relevant to say promote congruence between the actions of decision-makers and the law which 
should govern their actions”.49 
The second case was R (Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council, where the issue was 
whether the respondent authority had been in breach of a statutory duty to consult in relation to 
council tax schemes.50 In finding that the respondent authority had been in breach of that duty, Lord 
Wilson noted that the duty to consult can be sourced in either statute law or the common law and 
that, in the latter instance, “the search for the demands of fairness … is often illuminated by the 
                                                     
42 Board of Education v Rice [1911] AC 179, 182, Lord Loreburn. See further P Leyland and G Anthony, Textbook on 
Administrative Law, Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2013, ch 17.  
43 Eg, HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 & 5, [2010] 2 AC 534 (albeit as read in the light of the the Terrorist Asset-
Freezing Act [Temporary Provisions] Act 2010 and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010) and Bank Mellat v HM Treasury 
[2013] UKSC 38 & 39, [2014] AC 700.  
44 See further Leyland and Anthony, n 42 above, ch 16.  
45  See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255180/Consultation-
Principles-Oct-2013.pdf.  
46 [2013] UKSC, [2014] AC 1115.  
47 [2013] UKSC, [2014] AC 1115, 1149, para 67.  
48 [2013] UKSC, [2014] AC 1115, 1149, para 68.  
49 [2013] UKSC, [2014] AC 1115, 1150, para 71.  
50 [2014] UKSC 56, [2014] 1 WLR 3947.  
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doctrine of legitimate expectation”.51 Drawing upon Lord Reed’s earlier comments in Reilly, his 
Lordship reiterated that consultation can enhance the quality of decision-making and engender a 
deeper sense of justice, where he noted a further purpose of consultation as that which is “reflective 
of the democratic principle at the heart of our society”.52 Lord Reed, in Moseley, likewise spoke of 
the need for “meaningful public participation” through the medium of consultation, where his 
Lordship focused on the importance of the statutory context to the case before him.53  
Such dicta suggest that the language of participation is now infusing the courts’ approach to 
consultation, where a crucial link is made to a wider democratic ideal within public law more 
generally. But does this necessarily mean that the common law rules and so on will always allow 
individuals to participate in decision-making processes in the manner that is envisaged by the 
literature on administrative justice? At one level, the answer to this question can only be in the 
positive, as there will be many cases in which citizen involvement in decision-making is demanded 
and in which judicial protection of that involvement will be guaranteed. However, there are, at the 
same time, some limitations to the common law approach, and it is these that reveal some of the 
differences between administrative law and administrative justice such as were commented upon 
above. The point here is that the common law approach has its origins in an unavoidably adjudicative 
model whereby the focus will typically be placed upon the presentation of evidence and reasoned 
argument on behalf of the individual.54  While that model will, again, be suitable for many decision-
making processes, it may not be one that is suited to all, for instance those that are concerned with 
the initial allocation of benefits to vulnerable persons who come from a position of social need and 
who may not be able fully to project their own interests. It thus here that is sometimes said that a 
shift in institutional culture may be required so that consultation can become associated more with 
managerial and customer interests and less with a decision-making model that places parties in 
inevitable opposition to one another.55  
 
 
The Parliamentary Ombudsman 
 
The office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman in turn provides one of the best-known examples of 
how individuals can raise grievances outside the judicial process, where the primary value that is at 
work is accountability in respect of exercises and non-exercises of public power.56 Historically, the 
term “the Ombudsman” has very much been synonymous with the work of that office, although there 
are now many other ombudsmen that work within the public and private sectors.57 The office of the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman itself was created under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 and 
it is empowered to investigate complaints of “maladministration” that are made in relation to a wide 
range of central government departments and associated bodies58 (complaints are made through 
Members of the Westminster Parliament and may be made by any member of the public, including 
a corporation59). The threshold concept of “maladministration” is not defined in the legislation, 
                                                     
51 [2014] UKSC 56, [2014] 1 WLR 3947, 3956, para 23.  
52 [2014] UKSC 56, [2014] 1 WLR 3947, 3957, para 24.  
53 [2014] UKSC 56, [2014] 1 WLR 3947, 3962, para 39.  
54 See further Craig, n 19 above, at pp 380-383.  
55 Ibid, citing, among others, Jerry Mashaw’s seminal work, Bureaucratic Justice, Yale University Press, 1983.  
56 See further M Elliott, ‘Ombudsmen, Tribunals, Inquiries: Re-fashioning Accountability Beyond the Courts’ in N Bamforth 
and P Leyland (ed), Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2013, p 233.  
57 See further Harlow and Rawlings, n 6 above at pp 480-483, writing about “ombudsmania”.    
58 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s 4 and Sch 2.  
59 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, ss 5-6. 
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although it is generally taken to embrace “bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, 
arbitrariness and so on”.60 When investigating complaints, the Ombudsman enjoys significant powers 
of enquiry – for instance, in accessing information61 – albeit there are also some important limits to 
the office’s powers. These include a statutory requirement that maladministration should result in 
“injustice” before the Ombudsman can make adverse findings, 62  as well as a rule whereby 
investigations cannot be carried out when a complainant has, or had, a means of legal redress in the 
courts or tribunals.63 This latter rule has inevitably given rise to litigation, and there have been cases 
in which the Ombudsman has been held to have acted ultra vires by proceeding with an investigation 
when the affected individual had an alternative means of legal redress.64 However, the limiting effect 
of this rule must also be seen in the light of the Ombudsman’s discretion to investigate a complaint 
where he/she is satisfied that, in the particular circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect the 
remedy to be, or to have been, invoked.65 It is further significant that, whatever the formal legal 
position, there have been several – and in some cases celebrated – instances of overlap between the 
Ombudsman and the courts.66 
The principal remedy that is open to the Ombudsman is the publication of a report that 
recommends that the investigated department take one or several courses of action. 67  The 
Ombudsman does not, as such, have power to force a body to quash a decision, or change its 
practices and/or pay compensation, although the government department will often act on the 
recommendation. Moreover, where a public body is minded to reject a finding of fact on the part of 
the Ombudsman, case law has established that it may only do so for “cogent reasons”. Where no 
such reasons exist, it may be that the public body will have acted in a manner that is irrational in 
public law terms and that its decision may be quashed by way of an application for judicial review.68  
The above model is generally regarded as having been successful in ensuring a heightened 
degree of accountability, and some of the other areas in which the model has been adopted include 
local government, policing, prisons, and pensions.69 While the detail of each specific complaints 
system will depend upon the terms of its underlying statute (or agreement, for those other 
ombudsmen that operate in the private sector70), it is axiomatic that the ombudsman system offers 
a means of redress to individuals that is both low cost and potentially very effective in outcome. As 
against that, it is also the case that all public sector ombudsmen depend upon public funding to carry 
out their work, and austerity measures and limited resources are inevitably having some impact on 
the functioning of offices. The significance of this point will be returned to below, where the example 
of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland will be used to illustrate the tensions that now exist 
within the wider system of administrative justice. 
                                                     
60 The so-called “Crossman catalogue”. On the open-ended nature of the catalogue see R v Local Commissioner for 
Administration, ex p Bradford MCC [1979] QB 287. 
61 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, ss 8-9. 
62 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s 5(1)(a). And see, by analogy, R v Local Commissioner for Administration, ex p 
Eastleigh Borough Council [1988] QB 855; Re Sherrie’s Application [2013] NICA 18; and Re JR 55’s Application [2014] NICA 
11. 
63 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s 5(2). 
64 See, by analogy, R v Commissioner for Local Administration, ex p Croydon London Borough Council [1989] 1 All ER 1033. 
65 s 5(2). 
66 See, perhaps most famously, Congreve v Home Office [1976] 1 All ER 697, commented upon in Wade and Forsyth, n 9 
above, pp 76-77. 
67 Reports are published on-line and can be accessed at http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/. 
68 R (Bradley) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2009] EWCA Civ 36, [2009] QB 14. See also R (Equitable Members 
Action Group) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 2495 (Admin). 
69 See Leyland and Anthony, n 42 above, at pp 147-8. 
70 Harlow and Rawlings, n 6 above, p 481.  
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Tribunals 
 
It has already been noted above that tribunals perform an adjudicatory role in a wide range of areas 
and that they have historically been intended to provide individuals with effective and efficient 
means of redress before specialist decision-makers. The greater part of the modern tribunal system 
is now governed by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which established a two-tier 
structure within which First-tier tribunals in specific areas make decisions that may, with permission, 
be the subject of an appeal on a point of law to an Upper Tribunal and thereafter, and again only with 
permission, to the Court of Appeal (although appeals are not possible in cases in which the Upper 
Tribunal refuses permission to bring an appeal to the Court of Appeal, a point which is returned to 
below).71 The reforms that were made by the Act of 2007 were fundamental in their nature and 
changed the tribunal system in ways that have been said to amount to “a complete reordering of 
administrative justice”.72 For instance, the two-tier structure served to streamline appeals and give 
greater coherence to a system that had previously been piecemeal in nature and in which rights of 
appeal were variously available on a point of law and/or a point of fact, on a point of law only, or not 
at all (in which circumstance judicial review was available as a remedy). Another change was to mark 
out the tribunal system as independent from the government departments who make decisions that 
might be subject to adjudication: while tribunals had previously been closely aligned to government 
departments – they were therefore sometimes called “administrative tribunals” – the 2007 Act noted 
the independence of tribunal members as a constitutional imperative.73  
 The streamlining of appeal structures is the development that is of most immediate interest 
in the present context, as it includes linkages to anterior internal review mechanisms, as well as an 
overlap with the workings of judicial review. The linkages to internal review mechanisms are found 
in sections 9 and 10 of the Act of 2007, which enable either the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper 
Tribunal, respectively, to review one of its own decisions with a view to changing it. This review 
mechanism may be triggered either by the Tribunal acting on its own initiative or by a person who 
has a right of appeal against the decision, and it can lead the Tribunal to correct accidental errors, to 
amend the reasons that have been given in support of a decision, or to set a decision aside. Plainly, 
the last option is that which would ordinarily be preferred by the person with the right of appeal, 
although an amended statement of reasons may also give greater clarity and legitimacy to a decision. 
In either instance, the Act of 2007 provides that a decision can be subject to internal review only once 
and that it will thereafter become a matter for an appeal on a point of law to the Upper Tribunal or 
Court of Appeal, as appropriate, and with permission.74 
The overlap with judicial review can occur in two ways. The first is where the Upper Tribunal, 
a so-called “superior court of record”, can itself exercise a judicial review jurisdiction under the Act 
of 2007 and grant any of the remedies that would be available were proceedings to be brought by 
                                                     
71 2007 Act, ss 9-14. But note that the tribunal and appeals system as applies throughout the UK as a whole is more 
complex than this brief statement suggests: see the graph that is available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/tribunals_chart-01072015.pdf. Note also that there are tribunals that adjudicate within the 
specific contexts of the Northern Ireland and Scottish legal systems: see, respectively, https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-
gb/tribunals/Pages/Tribunals.aspx and https://scotcourts.gov.uk/the-courts/the-tribunals/about-scottish-tribunals. 
72 R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2010] EWCA Civ 859, [2011] QB 120, 169, para 29, Sedley LJ. 
73 Courts, Tribunals and Enforcement Act 2007, s 1, as read with the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 3. 
74 Courts, Tribunals and Enforcement Act 2007, ss 11 & 13. Although on the relationship between appeals on a point of 
law and errors of fact see E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 WLR 1351 and Jones v First Tier 
Tribuunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19, [2013] 2 AC 48. 
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way of application for judicial review in the High Court.75 Although the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
in this regard is narrowly drawn under the Act76 – the vast majority of its work will still come before 
it by way of appeal – the creation of a judicial review jurisdiction has further sought to consolidate 
the tribunal system by keeping disputes within its structures where that it is at all possible.77 The 
second way in which there can be an overlap with judicial review is where a decision of the Upper 
Tribunal itself is subject to judicial review in the High Court. This is an esoteric, yet important, point 
of law that has its context in cases, mentioned above, where the Upper Tribunal refuses an 
application for permission to bring an appeal to the Court of Appeal (such decisions are said to be 
“excluded” from any right of appeal to the Court of Appeal and the matter will thereby come to an 
end under the Act of 2007).78 In R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal79, the Supreme Court held that judicial 
review was available in respect of such refusals but that the High Court should intervene in Upper 
Tribunal decisions to refuse permission to appeal only in limited circumstances. In making this point, 
the Supreme Court held that the High Court should intervene solely where the case in which 
permission to appeal has been refused is one that raises some important question of principle or in 
which there is some other compelling reason why the matter should be heard. By approaching 
applications for judicial review in this way, it is understood that the High Court will be able to ensure 
that the rule of law is maintained without overburdening itself with cases that should, for the most 
part, be decided within the appellate structures in the Act of 2007.  
 
 
Judicial review  
 
And what, then, of judicial review and its place in the wider system of administrative justice? 
Certainly, the above analysis of consultation, Parliamentary Ombudsmen, and tribunals has revealed 
that it can play a role in each of those areas, whether by developing legal principles (as in Reilly and 
Moseley) and/or by providing remedies in the context of decision-making by the Upper Tribunal and 
the Parliamentary Ombudsman. However, to the extent that this suggests that judicial review is 
something of a constant within the workings of administrative justice, it says little about the precise 
nature of the judicial review procedure and the question of when individuals can have recourse to it. 
Moreover, even where an individual is able to have recourse to the judicial review procedure, there 
remains the point, made in the studies that were discussed in the first setion of this article, that it 
may have only a limited impact in practice. So, does this mean that judicial review is best understood 
as one of the lesser parts of the administrative justice machinery, its “high profile” cases 
notwithstanding?80 Or does its real significance lie in those high-profile cases and the values and 
principles that are developed within them? 
 Taking first the matter of the judicial review procedure, there is a long-established rule that 
recourse to it cannot be had where an individual has an effective alternative remedy, for instance a 
                                                     
75 Ss 15-21. On its status as a superior court of record see s 3(5). 
76 Courts, Tribunals and Enforcement Act 2007, s 18(6), as read with Practice Direction (Upper Tribunal: Judicial Review 
Jurisdiction) [2009] 1 WLR 327 and Practice Direction (Upper Tribunal: Judicial Review Jurisdiction) (No 2) [2012] 1 WLR 
16. 
77 See also, in England and Wales, s 31A of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as inserted by s 19 of the Courts, Tribunals and 
Enforcement Act 2007. 
78 Ss 13(1) & 8(c). 
79 [2011] UKSC 28, [2012] 1 AC 663. See, too the parallel judgment in respect of Scottish law in Eba v Advocate General 
for Scotland [2011] UKSC 29, [2012] 1 AC 710. 
80 Cane, n 20 above. 
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claim before a tribunal.81 This rudimentary requirement reflects the understanding that judicial 
review is a remedy of last resort and that individuals should instead avail themselves of remedies 
that have been put in place by, to continue with the example of tribunals, statute (such remedies 
may also be procedurally advantageous to the individual).82 Of course, where no such remedy exists, 
it will be appropriate for an individual to bring an application for judicial review, albeit as subject to 
practical considerations of costs and the dispute being one that falls within the realm of public law.83 
This latter requirement is one that has given rise to some complexity in the case law not only because 
of the early procedural rigidity of the public/private divide but also because of uncertainty about the 
nature of decisions that are taken by, most prominently, private companies performing contracted-
out government functions.84 While the procedural rigidity of the public/private divide has since been 
relaxed,85 the question whether a particular decision falls within the realm of public law continues to 
give rise to occasional difficulties in the case law. Indeed, in some instances, the difficulties have been 
such that the legislature has had to intervene and override the effects of judgments that have been 
said to have drawn too narrowly the parameters of public law protections.86  
 Where the facts of a case fall within the realm of public law and an individual wishes to initiate 
proceedings, he or she must first observe a pre-action protocol that is meant to facilitate the 
resolution of disputes at source, save in those cases where an authority does not have the power to 
change its decision or where the dispute has arisen as an emergency (for instance, in a case 
concerning health).87 At the heart of the protocol are requirements about an exchange of letters 
whereby an individual will identify the decision that he or she wishes to challenge and the public 
authority will explain whether or not it is willing to change the decision. Should that exchange of 
letters not result with a resolution of the dispute, proceedings may then be commenced by any 
person who has a “sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates” and who has 
initiated proceedings within (what will usually be) a three-month time-limit (time runs from the date 
of the decision, not the end of the protocol process).88 In the event that the High Court considers 
that there is an arguable case, it will grant leave, or permission, to proceed to a full hearing, at which 
stage the individual must demonstrate that the public authority has acted unlawfully. Should he or 
she is be able to do so, the High Court may, in its discretion, variously grant a number of quashing, 
mandatory, and/or declaratory orders, as well as (more exceptionally) damages.89  
The further question of whether judicial review’s real significance lies in its high-profile cases 
can perhaps best be answered with reference to the grounds upon which an individual will challenge 
the lawfulness of a public authority’s actions. Although there have also been some important 
doctrinal developments in relation to points of procedure – the “sufficient interest” threshold has 
been interpreted liberally by way of facilitating public interest litigation90 – the grounds for review 
have been developed in evermore innovative ways over the past 30 years or so. Central to those 
                                                     
81 On the guiding principles see M Belhoff and H Mountfield, ‘There is no Alternative’ [1999] 4 Judicial Review 143. 
82 See Re Kirkpatrick’s Application for Judicial Review [2003] NIQB 49, especially at paras 40-41. 
83 On costs see, eg, R (Edwards) v Environment Agency (No 2) [2013] UKSC 78, [2014] 1 WLR 55. 
84 See Leyland and Anthony, n 42 above, ch 9. 
85 N 17 above. 
86 See, as regards, the reach of the Human Rights Act 1998, YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95, 
as read with s 145 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. 
87 See further M Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 6th ed, 2012, Part 19.1. 
88 Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31(3); and Part 54.5 of the Civil Procedure Rules. See further Leyland and Anthony n 42 above, 
pp 201-210. 
89 Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31(1) & (4). On the discretionary nature of the remedies see C Forsyth, ‘The rock and the 
sand: jurisdiction and remedial discretion’ [2013] 18 Judicial Review 360.  
90 N 18 above.  
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grounds has been an increasingly robust rule of law doctrine that, while fully cognisant of the 
importance of the context to any decision and the need for judicial restraint in appropriate cases, 
emphasises that all forms of public power are ultimately subject to judicial control.91 This has led the 
courts to develop a range of procedural and substantive dimensions to the grounds for review and, 
as noted above, to move towards values that may more readily be associated with the language of 
governance studies than public law orthodoxy.92 While it may well be that decision-makers will not 
be familiar with such doctrines and values as they take decisions on a daily basis – a point that has 
been made in some of the work on the impact of judicial review93 – they still establish the outer-
markers within which public power may lawfully be exercised. It may therefore be that this is where 
judicial review’s true contribution to administrative justice is to be found and understood: it is able 
to provide normative reference points for the system as a whole and, in that way, ensure that the 
system remains grounded in the rule of law.  
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE – SOME CHALLENGES 
 
The final matter to be addressed is that of austerity and its impact upon administrative justice.94 
Plainly, the practical success of the above mechanisms will depend, in large part, on the availability 
of public monies, whether to support the workings of the judicial and other institutions or to provide 
legal aid to individuals with limited economic means who may wish to, for instance, initiate judicial 
review proceedings. However, the reality in the UK, certainly since 2010, has been one in which much 
public funding for administrative justice has been frozen or reduced, in which some institutions have 
been abolished, and in which other institutions have had to reassess their spending priorities.95 This 
has inevitably led to judicial review challenges to, among other things, institutional failures to 
discharge statutory duties and to government decisions to modify the funding arrangements that 
underlie legal proceedings.96 For the High Court, such challenges have presented constitutionally 
difficult questions, as government decisions as to the level of public spending on services are typically 
regarded as political choices that demand judicial self-restraint.97 Austerity cases have, in that way, 
engaged the rule of law doctrine in settings that have sometimes been defined not just by the 
interests of individuals but also by much wider questions of policy.  
 Two cases can be used to illustrate the nature of the challenge for the High Court and, in turn, 
for the wider system of administrative justice. The first is Re Martin’s Application98, which was alluded 
to above and which concerned a delay in the investigative processes of the office of the Police 
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. That office was established by section 51 of the Police (Northern 
Ireland) Act 1998 and is under a range of statutory duties related to the processing of complaints 
about the actions of officers in the Police Service of Northern Ireland. On the facts of Martin, the 
                                                     
91 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2006] 1 AC 262, 304, para 107, Lord Hope. 
92 N 41 above, and text. For some procedural and substantive dimensions see, on legitimate expectations, R v North and 
East Devon Heath Authority, ex p Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622. 
93  But compare the government’s internal publication, The Judge Over Your Shoulder, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/256111/judge.pdf. 
94 On austerity see M O’Hara, Austerity Bites: A journey to the sharp end of cuts in the UK, Policy Press, 2014.  
95 For abolition see, most prominently, the Public Bodies (Abolition of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council) 
Order 2013, SI 2042/2013. For some current issues see http://ukaji.org/2015/08/10/whats-new-in-administrative-
justice-august-2015/. 
96 T Dyke, ‘Judicial Review in an Age of Austerity’ [2011] 16 Judicial Review 202. 
97 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Nottinghamshire CC [1986] AC 240. 
98 [2012] NIQB 89. 
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Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland had referred to the Police Ombudsman his 
concerns about the conduct of police officers who had been involved in a criminal prosecution in 
1991 that had led to the wrongful conviction of the applicant, Mr James Martin. The Police 
Ombudsman sought to explain that the subsequent delay in investigating the complaint had been 
caused by the fact that it was one of a growing number of historical cases that had created very real 
funding pressures within his office as it also tried to investigate contemporary complaints against 
police officers. This essentially meant that the case reduced to the question whether the Police 
Ombudsman’s delay in performing his statutory duty could be justified for reasons of limited funding, 
or whether the delay in the case was such as to breach the implicit public law requirement to conduct 
an investigation within a reasonable time. While the judge who heard the case, Treacy J, 
acknowledged that the Police Ombudsman would normally enjoy very considerable latitude when 
making choices about the allocation of resources within his office, he considered that the delay in 
this case went beyond that which could be deemed acceptable. As the judge expressed the point: 
“The decided cases make clear that … (i)t is only if the delay is so excessive as to be regarded as 
manifestly unreasonable that a claim might be entertained by the court ... I have concluded, against 
the exceptional background of the present case, that by reason of chronic underfunding at the 
material time the respondent was disabled from discharging its statutory duty to investigate within 
a reasonable time”.99 
The second case is R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor100, which concerned the lawfulness of changes 
to the fees regime that governs claims in employment tribunals.101 The new regime required the 
payment of fees before claims and appeals could be brought in the tribunals, and the applicant, a 
public sector union, argued that the regime: (a) breached the EU law principle of effectiveness 
because many individuals would be unable to afford to bring proceedings to vindicate their rights; 
and (b) discriminated indirectly against women because a majority of claimants in employment cases 
are women. In dismissing the application for judicial review, the High Court noted that the EU law 
principle of effectiveness overlaps with the right of access to a court and that that right can be subject 
to limitation by way of fees so long as the fees do not make it virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult for individuals to bring proceedings. While the Court accepted, on the evidence before it, 
that there had been a drop in the number of tribunal claims since the introduction of the new regime, 
it was of the view that the applicant had not shown that this was because individuals were unable to 
bring proceedings as opposed to simply electing not to make claims. Moreover, on the matter of 
discrimination, the Court found that the fuller evidence did not support the applicant’s submissions 
and that, in fact, the fees structures were largely balanced as between the genders. The regime that 
had been put in place was therefore lawful: it pursued the legitimate objectives of seeking to transfer 
the costs of tribunals to those who used them whilst making the tribunals more efficient, and it did 
so though means that were proportionate to those objectives. 
Unison is on appeal to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales at the time of writing this 
article, and it may be that that Court will reach different conclusions on the law and evidence before 
it. However, in the absence of that ruling, the judgment of the High Court remains authoritative and, 
indeed, indicative of the challenge that the wider administrative justice system faces. As was stated 
above, the funding of tribunals and so on is largely a political choice that must command the respect 
of the courts in a legal system that is centred upon not only the rule of law but also its correlate in 
the separation of powers doctrine. While this does not mean that the courts will never intervene in 
government choices – Martin points to disapproval of at least the consequences of limited funding, 
                                                     
99 [2012] NIQB 89, paras 42-43. 
100 [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin), [2015] 2 CMLR 4 at 111. 
101 The regime was contained in the Courts and Tribunals Fees Remission Order, SI 2013/2302. 
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and Unison of the need to ensure that access to justice does not become impossible102 – it does mean 
that the courts will not generally seek to adjudicate on broader questions of policy. The shape of the 
administrative justice system may, in that sense, rightly be said to be determined as much by politics 
as it is by law.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article began by noting that it had three modest objectives: to explain how and why the language 
of administrative justice has become more prominent in the UK in recent years; to identify some of 
the primary mechanisms within the system of administrative justice; and to outline some of the 
challenges that the system faces in an era of austerity. Its resulting analysis of the principles and 
values that infuse the system, and which exist along its administration-adjudication continuum, has 
perhaps revealed two key points that should be emphasised by way of conclusion. The first is that, 
for public lawyers in the UK, administrative justice remains fundamentally concerned with 
maximising the scope for efficient, informed, and fair public decision-making as affects individuals. 
While an individual’s interests will not, of course, thereby always be paramount – adjudication will 
typically balance an individual’s interests with those of other parties and/or the wider public interest 
– the clear aspiration is for a system that will facilitate fuller engagement with the individual from 
the very outset of the decision-making process. If that occurs, it is expected that initial decisions will 
be taken in a manner that is more efficient, informed, and fair, and that those qualities will aid and 
define any subsequent complaints and/or adjudicatory processes.  
 The second point concerns the need for caution when assessing the relative significance of 
the various mechanisms of administrative justice. As was noted at the beginning of this article, 
administrative justice emerged as a field of study after a shift towards socio-legal analysis in the 
1990s and a growing awareness of the limitations of judicial review both as a remedy and as a tool 
that influences bureaucratic behaviour. However, this article has also sought to outline the role that 
judicial review continues to play in administrative justice by establishing the paramaters of legality in 
the modern administrative state and by, for instance, safeguarding fair hearing and participation 
rights (albeit as determined by an adjudicative model). While that description of judicial review 
should not be taken to challenge the strength of compelling empirical data about its limitations, it 
should be taken to embed the point that the remedies that are available to individuals are best 
viewed holistically and as rooted in the rule of law. In the final analysis, it is that fact which gives 
administrative justice its relevance in the modern administrative state, even at a time of diminishing 
public expenditure on its institutions and values.103  
 
                                                     
102 And see, eg, IS v The Director of Legal Aid Casework [2015] EWHC 1965 (Admin). 
103 For some possible future directions see C Skelcher, ‘Reforming the oversight of administrative justice 2010-2014: does 
the UK need a new Leggatt Report?’ [2015] Public Law 215. 
